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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent international trade panel decision highlights concerns re-
garding whether United States environmental protection laws conflict
with international free trade agreements.1 The panel held that the United
States' ban on the importation of tuna captured by purse-seine nets in
international waters violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GAT). 2 Environmentalists objected to the decision, claiming
that it could "accelerate environmental degradation and undermine na-
tional and international efforts to address ecological problems.",3
The relationship between the issues of environmental protection and
international trade has been receiving increased attention recently. In
June 1992, representatives from more than 170 nations attended the
Earth Summit in Brazil to "plan for a world economy that can continue
to grow without irreversible ecological damage."4
Recently proposed laws in the United States Congress attempt to
First Place, 1992 Stanley I. and Hope S. Adelstein Environmental Law Award, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, August 16, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna Panel
Report].
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1948). See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 4 BASIC IN-
STRIUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-78 (1969) [hereinafter GAIT].
3 John Hunt, Free Traders Heading for Clash with Greens, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at
16. See also Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling; Trade Pact Imperils Environmental
Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at D1 (discussing American environmentalists' concerns about
whether United States laws protecting endangered species are permissible under the GATT).
4 Paul Lewis, U.S. Under Fire In Talks at U.N. On Environment: Poor Nations Ask Help
to Cut Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1992, at Al. See also David Dowdell, Trade and
the Environment; GATT Issues Warning Against Environmental Imperialism, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12
1992, at Section 13; Hunt, supra note 3. For the results of the Earth Summit, see infra note 31.
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address these two issues. 5 One bill, the International Pollution Deter-
rence Act of 1991 (IPDA),6 would impose a duty upon products im-
ported into the United States from countries that failed "to impose and
enforce effective pollution controls and environmental safeguards."7
Although the IPDA addresses environmental protection, a GATT panel
could rule that because nations have no international legal obligation to
adopt environmental protection standards similar to those of the United
States, the IPDA would constitute a barrier to trade which conflicts with
the GATT.
This Note proposes a different method of environmental protection
which would be permissible under the GATT. Rather than attempting to
hold foreign nations accountable to United States environmental protec-
tion standards, the United States should hold foreign manufacturers
accountable to United States standards, regardless of the manufacturers'
nationalities. This Note proposes a framework for amending the Clean
Air Act' which would require foreign manufacturers to comply with
similar air quality standards as domestic manufacturers. If a foreign
manufacturer violated the proposed Amended Clean Air Act, the United
States would be able to assess a civil penalty upon the manufacturer's
imported products.
In Part II, this Note discusses ozone depletion and the foundations
of international environmental law.9 Ozone depletion demonstrates that
the effects of pollution are not confined to the nation causing the pollu-
tion. The global impact of ozone depletion and other forms of pollution
require each nation to ensure that activity within its jurisdiction does not
pollute the environments of other nations. Part In demonstrates that the
IPDA is an unfair barrier to international trade which conflicts with the
GATT.10 In Part IV, the Note describes the proposed Amendments to
the Clean Air Act and reviews the GATT panel ruling regarding the
United States ban on the importation of tuna captured in purse-seine
nets in international waters." The Note demonstrates that the Amended
Clean Air Act would not violate international law and is permissible un-
der the GATT.
' See, e.g., Global Environmental Protection and Trade Equity Act, S. 2887, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990) Oinking trade benefits to a series of pollution control standards).
6 International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, S. 984, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter IPDA].
7 Id. § 3(a) & (b).
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1989 & Supp. 1992).
See infra text accompanying notes 12-45.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 46-72.
n See infra text accompanying notes 73-118.
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II. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND OTHER FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Pollution Does Not Recognize National Borders
Ozone depletion demonstrates the first principle of international
environmental law: pollution does not recognize the artificial borders
drawn by countries. Currently, ozone depletion is the only environmental
threat for which there are international standards to which almost every
nation has an obligation to comply.
In 1928, chemists at General Motors developed the extremely stable
and long-lived gaseous substance, chloroflourocarbon (CFC).'2 CFCs
are used as propellants for aerosol sprays, cleansers for electronic parts
and coolants for refrigerators and air conditioners.' 3 Because of their
stability and longevity, CFCs were praised as technological triumphs. 4
Not everyone was praising CFCs, however. In 1974, two chemists
at the University of California, Irvine, published an article sounding a
warning that CFCs destroy atmospheric ozone. 5 According to the
chemists, when CFCs are released into the atmosphere, they break down
and release chlorine atoms.' 6 The chlorine destroys the ozone mole-
cules in the stratosphere and transforms them into simple two-atom
oxygen molecules, which do not absorb the sun's ultraviolet rays.17
Chlorine atoms can remain in the atmosphere for over a century and
react with more ozone molecules spread over vast areas, continuing the
transformation process.' The result of these reactions, duplicated thou-
sands of times, is "an ozone danse macabre in which just one chlorine
atom may be responsible for the demise of many ozone molecules."' 9
2 Michael D. Lemonick, The Heat Is On: Chemical Wastes Spewed into the Air Threaten
the Earth's Climate, TIME, Oct. 19, 1987, at 58.
' Richard S. Stolarski, The Antarctic Ozone Hole, 258 SC. AM. 30, 31 (1988).
, David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of Inter-
national Environmental Lawmaking, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 755, 756 (1991).
" Mario J. Molina & F.S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chloroflouromethanes: Chlorine
Atom-catalysed Destruction of the Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). Ozone is an oxygen molecule
composed of three oxygen atoms. Stolarski, supra note 13, at 30. It absorbs most of the sun's
ultraviolet rays, preventing them from reaching the earth. Id. If these ultraviolet rays were to
reach the earth, they could cause eye cataracts, skin cancer, immune deficiencies, and could harm
crops and aquatic systems. Id.
,6 Molina, supra note 15, at 810.
17 Id.
, Stolarski, supra note 13, at 32-33.
t' John W. Kindt & Samuel P. Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in Inter-
national Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 261, 265 (1989).
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One of the University of California chemists commented that, "[f]or
every chlorine atom [released],... 100,000 molecules of ozone are
removed from the atmosphere."2
The continued depletion in the ozone poses a global environmental
threat. In the late 1980s, a majority of the world's nations gathered in
Montreal, Canada to address this threat. Out of that meeting came the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montre-
al Protocol).21 Over sixty countries signed and ratified the Montreal
Protocol,' which sets limits on the consumption and production of
CFCs by the Protocol's signatories.23 Richard Benedick, one of the
United States negotiators of the Montreal Protocol, said it was truly a
unique accomplishment because the Protocol was originally believed to
be an impossible achievement due to the complex issues and widely
divergent initial positions of the parties.24
In addition to ozone depletion, other forms of pollution continue to
threaten the global environment. In 1987, .the World Commission on
Environment and Development reported to the United Nations that:
"environmental trends ... threaten to radically alter the planet, ...
[and] the lives of many species upon it, including the human spe-
cies." . .. Mhese trends ... includ[e] desertification, deforestation,
acid deposition, global warming (the "greenhouse effect") caused by
the burning of fossil fuels, depletion of the ozone layer by other indus-
trial gases, and the introduction of toxic substances into the human
food chain and underground water tables.5
Besides the Montreal Protocol, several international agreements
recognize that pollution does not stop at a national borders. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a group of
industrialized countries including the United States, most of Europe and
Japan, acknowledged this fact in one of its recommendations on protect-
' Lemonick, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting F.S. Rowland).
21 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
22 For a complete list of countries that have signed and ratified the Montreal Protocol as of
August 2, 1990, see RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGU-
ARDING THE PLANET, 265-269 (1991).
2' Montreal Protocol, supra note 21, art. 2, at 1552.
24 BENEDICK, supra note 22, at 1.
25 Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Liability and International Watercourses: The Work of
the International Law Commission Relating to International Pollution, in INT'L L. & POLLUTION
90, 90 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991) (citing WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DE-
VELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 2-3 (1987), also published as U.N. Doc. A/42/427/Annex
(1987)).
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ing the global environment. This recommendation states: "'Transfrontier
pollution' means any intentional or unintentional pollution whose physi-
cal origin is subject to, and situated wholly or in part within the area
under the national jurisdiction of one country and which has effects in
the area under the national jurisdiction of another Country."26
The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution includes a provision recognizing the global nature of air pol-
lution:
"[L]ong-range transboundary air pollution" means air pollution whose
physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the
national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the
area under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is
not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual
emission sources or groups of sources. 7
In 1985, the Hague Academy of International Law developed prin-
ciples for addressing the problem of transboundary pollution which in-
clude recognizing the international attributes of pollution:
The term "pollution" means the introduction by man, directly or indi-
rectly, of substances or energy into the environment resulting in delete-
rious effects of a nature to endanger the human health, living resources
and ecosystems, deteriorate natural properties, and impair or interfere
with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment.
The expression "transfrontier pollution" means, unless otherwise
indicated, any pollution which, provoked by activities conducted in the
territory or under the control of one State, produces effects deleterious
to the environment in other States or in areas beyond the limits of any
national jurisdiction.28
Prior to the Montreal Protocol, international environmental law
consisted merely of broad policy statements29 or regional agreem-
' Council Recommendation for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access
and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 42nd mtg., Annex, O.E.C.D. Doe. C(77)28(Final), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 977, 978 (1977).
2 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, art. 1(b),
34 U.S.T. 3043, 3046, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217,219.
22 Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations, Hague
Academy of International Law, Corpus of Principles and Rules Relative to the Protection of the
Environment against Transfrontier Pollution Established by the French-Speaking Section, art. 1, in
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION & INT'L L. 27, 27 (1986) [hereinafter HAGUE ACADEMY].
' See, e.g., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, Principle 21, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 24, 1972, at 116, 118, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M.
1993]
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ents.30 The Montreal Protocol added substance to the principles of this
newly emerging legal field. The Montreal Protocol is the first, and so
far only, multilateral non-regional international environmental agreement
which sets environmental standards for its signatories.3
B. The Obligation to Avoid Polluting Other Nations
1. The Trail Smelter Principle
Besides the principle that pollution does not recognize the artificial
boundaries drawn by nations, another important general principle of
international law, drawn from international adjudications and agreements,
is that no nation has the sovereign right to pollute the air of another
nation. This principle dates back to the Trail Smelter case, 32 a pre-
World War II arbitral decision regarding sulfur dioxide emissions from a
Canadian zinc and lead smelter near the United States border. The Unit-
ed States presented its claim to Canada on behalf of farmers in the state
of Washington whose property and crops had been damaged by the
emissions from the smelter. The two countries agreed to submit the
matter to arbitration.
The arbitral tribunal held that Canada was liable to the American
farmers for the damage caused by the smelter.33 In its decision, the
tribunal laid down the first legal principle of international environmental
law:
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence. 3
1416, 1420, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declara-
tion].
30 See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes
Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, 15 U.S.T. 301.
31 The only document at the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil which the United States signed
was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As of September 1992, the
United States Senate has not yet ratified it. The Framework Convention, unlike the Montreal
Protocol, provides only broad policy statements regarding international environmental protection. It
fails to provide numeric environmental standards. United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, May 9, 1992 (on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law).
32 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
31 Id. at 1965-1966.
34 Id. at 1965.
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The International Court of Justice used this holding as a guiding
principle when it decided the Corfu Channel case in 1949.35 The Court
found Albania liable to Great Britain for damage incurred by a British
ship when it was struck by an Albanian-laid mine.36 Liability arose
from the fact that Albania did not warn Great Britain or the British ship
that Albanian territorial waters were mined.37 Expanding the Trail
Smelter principle, the Court held that every State has the obligation "not
to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other States."38 This holding would preclude a nation from knowing-
ly permitting pollution to emit within its jurisdiction that would effect
the environment of another nation.
The Trail Smelter principle was applied by another arbitral tribunal
in the 1957 Lake Lanoux case.3 9 In this case, French public works
threatened to pollute water which flowed into Spain. In its holding, the
Tribunal employed the principle that "[t]here is" a rule prohibiting the
upper riparian State from altering the waters of a river in circumstances
calculated to do serious injury to the lower riparian State. 40
These precedents point towards a general principle that no nation
has the sovereign right to pollute the air or water of another nation.
Although international law does not use a system of binding precedents
to decide a case, the precedent set by these cases could be used persua-
sively.
2. International Agreements
In addition to international adjudications, United Nations agreements
and resolutions also establish this general principle of international envi-
ronmental responsibility. In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment asserted, "States have ... the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 41
3 Corfu Channel Case (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). For an accurate summa-
don of the case, see SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A.B.A., INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE OPINION BRIEFS 1-1 to 1-3 (1978) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
3 A.B.A., supra note 35, at 1-2.
37 id.
33 Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
39 Lake Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
156 (1959).
40 Id., 24 I.L.R. at 140.
41 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 29, Principle 21, at 118.
19931
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The Hague Academy of International Law also recognizes this
responsibility in its principles on international environmental law.
In the exercise of their sovereign rights to exploit and use their natural
resources pursuant to their development policies States take into ac-
count the impact of actual or anticipated activities in areas placed
under their jurisdiction, on the environment situated beyond national
frontiers. They take, in good faith and with due diligence, appropriate
measures to prevent transfrontier pollution by elaborating, in particular,
rules and procedures adapted to the requirements of the production of
the environment, and see to it that these are effectively applied.42
The United Nations maintains this concept of transnational responsi-
bility. A recent General Assembly resolution
reaffirms that States have... [the] responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and the need to play their due role in preserving and pro-
tecting the global environment in accordance with their capacities and
specific responsibilities.43
Currently, the United Nations International Law Commission is
attempting to codify and develop the nations' responsibility for trans-
national and international pollution." The Commission recognizes that
a polluting state has obligations towards other States affected by the pol-
lution through tort liability.45
These international agreements and judicial cases establish that
nations have the responsibility and duty to ensure that activities within
their control or jurisdiction do not cause environmental harm to other
nations. The current state of international environmental law recognizes
the two principles that pollution poses a global threat and that nations
have the affirmative duty to not pollute other nations. If a nation were
to unilaterally impose environmental protection regulations, consistent
with international law, which required another nation's compliance, the
regulations must either be within the framework of these two principles
in order to be consistent with international law, or the nation must ob-
tain the consent of the regulated nation.
42 HAGUE ACADEMY, supra note 28, art. II, at 27.
43 General Assembly Resolution on Protection of the Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 85, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/207 (1989), reprinted in 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 43, 44 (1990).
" McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 91.
45Id. at 93-95.
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1IH. THE INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION DETERRENCE ACT AND
THE GATT
A. The International Pollution Deterrence Act
Rather than addressing only foreign nations' responsibilities to
control transnational pollution, the International Pollution Deterrence Act
(IPDA),46 proposed in the United States Senate, addresses the concerns
of American industries that compliance with strict United States environ-
mental protection standards damages the ability of United States compa-
nies to compete globally.47
Recent surveys demonstrate that the United States business
community's concerns are not unfounded. In 1990, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a report stating that
pollution control expenditures were higher in the United States than in
many Western European countries.48 In 1985, the percentage of the
United States' gross domestic product expenditures on pollution control
was up to 76 percent higher than such expenditures in Finland, France,
the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.49 If expenditures for
pollution control is indicative of a nation's concern for environmental
protection, then it would necessarily follow that other countries do not
believe that environmental protection is as important as the United
States does.
One of the Congressional findings of the bill is that the United
States alone cannot halt the global threat to the environment. It states
that "solely by its own efforts ... the United States cannot halt the
continuing and, in many cases, irreversible damage to the world's eco-
systems caused by other countries' failure to shoulder their part of the
burden of protecting the global environment."5 Furthermore, the bill
46IPDA, supra note 6.
4" See, e.g., William S. Ferguson, Note, International Trade Implications of Pollution Con-
trol, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 368 (1973). Funds which could be spent for modernization and ex-
pansion are channeled instead to the purchase and maintenance of pollution control equipment.
Id.; OSHA, EPA Regulations Contributed to U.S. Productivity Slowdown, Study Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 176, at A-9 (Sept. 11, 1991) (claiming that "the effect of regulatory enforce-
ment, combined with industry's focus on regulations and compliance rather than profits and pro-
ductivity, are the major factors in declining productivity evidenced by less competitive products -
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-230-11-083, ENVIRONMENTAL
INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 9-3 (1990).
49 Id at 9-3, 9-10 and 9-21. See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT MONOGRAPHS No. 38, POLLUTION CONTROL AND ABATEMENT
EXPENDITURE IN OECD COUNTRIES: A STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM 40 (1990).
"0 IPDA, supra note 6, § 2(4).
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states that, "the significance and serious competitive advantage enjoyed
by ...foreign competitors from cost savings derived from the absence
of effective pollution controls results in cheaper foreign imports which
capture United States market share and injure United States industr-
ies."51 The bill finds that this competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign
competitors constitutes an environmental subsidy and is a barrier to in-
ternational trade.52 The IPDA would impose a countervailing duty to
offset what is perceived to be a subsidy deriving from the "failure to
imposes and enforce effective pollution controls and environmental
safeguards . .. .,53
B. Countervailing Duties And Subsidies Under The GATT
The IPDA's concepts of countervailing duties and subsidies are
inconsistent with the GATT, a multilateral international trade treaty
signed by 102 nations, as of June 1991.m The GATT's goal is the
"substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimi-
"155nation of discriminatory treatment in international commerce ....
Article VI of the GATT, requires a country that wishes to impose a
countervailing duty to first determine that the exporting country has
granted a subsidy on the exported product.56 In 1979, the contracting
parties to the GATT provided procedures for determining subsidies and
countervailing duties in the Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT Subsidies Code).57
SI Id. § 2(6).
52 Id. § 2(7) ("[T]he failure of a government to impose effective environmental controls on
production and manufacturing facilities within its borders should be recognized for what it is -
a significant and unfair subsidy .... "). See also 137 Cong. Rec. S5298, 5299 (daily ed. Apr.
25, 1991):
[S]trictly regulating pollution within [the United States'] borders, while main-
taining the largest and most open market in the world, can impair our com-
petitiveness and provide unfair advantages to foreign competitors subject to
less stringent or effective pollution control. Cheaper foreign goods carry a
hidden price tag if they are produced free of meaningful environmental
protection.
Id. (statement of Sen. Boren).
53 IPDA, supra note 6, § 3(a) & (b).
54 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DoCUMENTs, SUPP. No. 37, at X (1991) [hereinafter
BISD].
5' GAIT, supra note 2, Preamble.
6 Id. art. VI:3.
57 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,
XVI and XXIII, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 18 I.L.M. 579 [hereinafter GATT Subsidies
Code].
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The GATT Subsidies Code requires that a countervailing duty be
imposed only pursuant to an "investigation to determine the existence,
degree and effect of any alleged subsidy.""8 The investigation should
"be initiated upon a written request by or on behalf of the industry
affected"59 to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
(the Committee). 6W If the Committee determines that enough evidence
exists to warrant an investigation to decide whether a subsidy exists, it
shall notify all interested parties and issue a public notice regarding the
investigation.6'
As of September 1992, the United States has not requested an
investigation into the existence of an environmental subsidy. According-
ly, the determination of whether a subsidy exists must fail because the
United States failed to follow the proper procedures for determining a
subsidy.
Even if the United States had requested an investigation, however,
the Committee would probably have determined that a countervailable
subsidy did not exist. Nothing in the history of subsidies supports the
theory that the failure of one nation to impose and enforce the environ-
mental protection standards of another nation constitutes a
countervailable subsidy.
Article XVI of the GATT defines a subsidy as "any form of in-
come or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into,
its territory .... . 6 2 Unfortunately, neither the GATT nor the GATT
Subsidies Code provides a clearer definition of a subsidy. However, by
examining the effects of governmental income and price supports, a
sense of what a subsidy is becomes clearer.
There are two types of subsidies: export subsidies and domestic or
production subsidies. 63 Export subsidies are granted upon products only
when they are actually exported. Professor Alan Sykes of the University
of Chicago School of Law defines an export subsidy as, "any govern-
ment program" or practice that increases the profitability of export sales
but does not similarly increase the profitability of sales for domestic
consumpton." 64 The GATT Subsidies Code provides some examples of
58 Id. art. 1:1, 31 U.S.T. at 519, 18 1.L.M. at 582.
5 id.
60 Id. at fn. 5, 31 U.S.T. 519, 18 1.L.M. at 583.
61 Id. art. 11:3, 31 U.S.T. at 520, 18 I.L.M. at 583.
62 GATr, supra note 2, art. XVI:1.
63 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 249 (1989).
64 Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1993]
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export subsidies, none of which refer to a government's failure to in-
stitute effective environmental regulation and standards.65
Domestic subsidies are granted regardless of whether the products
are exported. "They involve a vast range and number of government
policies, many of which are perfectly justifiable as exercises of sover-
eign activity within a country. ' ' 6 In order to be countervailable under
the United States Tariff Act of 1930,67 a domestic subsidy must specif-
ically target an enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or indus-
tries, and provide an advantage or opportunity to those producers that
would normally not be available in the marketplace.68
Based upon these clarifications, ineffective environmental protection
standards could be a subsidy only if: 1) products manufactured for ex-
port were manufactured under lower environmental standards than the
same products manufactured for domestic sale, or 2) a specific industry
is exempted from environmental protection standards with which all
other industries must comply (i.e., a nation's auto industry is exempt
from sulfur dioxide emissions standards but all other steel-based indus-
tries must comply). If there is no subsidy, then the United States cannot
impose a countervailing duty which is consistent with the GATT be-
cause the GATT Subsidies Code requires that "[n]o countervailing duty
shall be levied on any imported product in excess of the amount of the
subsidy found to exist ...."'
The IPDA does not allege that either of these conditions exist.
Rather, the bill finds that a subsidy exists because of a government's
failure to act, and impose effective environmental standards." The
GATT could not have possibly intended to identify this failure as a
subsidy. When the GATT was formed in 1947, there was not as much
concern for the environment as there is at present.
Under current international law, a nation is not required to impose
199, 203 (1989).
6 GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 57, Annex, 31 U.S.T. at 546, 18 1.L.M. at 615. Some
examples of export subsidies include direct governmental support of an industry contingent upon
export performance and lower transport and freight charges mandated by the government for
domestic shipments.
6 JACKSON, supra note 63, at 250.
67 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677k (1988).
68 Tariff Act of 1930, § 771, 19 U.S.C. §1677(5)(A)(ii) (1988). See also Sykes, supra note
64, at 204.
69 GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 57, art. IV:2, 31 U.S.T. at 523, 18 I.L.M. at 588
(footnote omitted).
70 IPDA, supra note 6, § 2(7) ('[T]he failure of a government to impose environmental
controls on production and manufacturing facilities within its borders should be recognized for
what it is - a significant and unfair subsidy . . ").
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effective environmental protection standards, unless it is a party to a
treaty which requires such imposition7 (i.e., the Montreal Protocol). A
failure to impose effective environmental protection standards, absent a
treaty, does not create a countervailable subsidy.
If the United States levies a countervailing duty under the IPDA, it
would be in violation of the GATr. Article XIII of the GATT provides
that "[n]o prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party . . . unless the importation of the like product of all
third countries ... is similarly prohibited or restricted."72 The IPDA
would not regulate the importation of products in a manner consistent
with Article XlII because the United States would levy a countervailing
duty on the products of one country yet might not levy the same duty
upon the products of another country.
If the ]PDA were to become law and the United States levies a
countervailing duty upon imports from a nation without effective envi-
ronmental protection laws, that nation could successfully challenge the
United States action before a GATT panel. Because the IPDA's novel
definition of a subsidy would not survive a panel's strict scrutiny. The
United States would be in violation of Article XII of the GATT for
imposing restrictions upon the importation of products depending upon
the country of origin.
IV. THE AMENDED CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE GATT
A. The Current Clean Air Act
In its present form the Clean Air Act73 requires the EPA Adminis-
trator to propose a national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for
air pollutants which effect public health or welfare.74 The NAAQS re-
flects the ratio of the pollutant to a specific volume of air. For example,
the NAAQS for lead is 1.5 micrograms of lead per cubic meter of air,
as the maximum arithmetic mean averaged over a calendar quarter.75
The Administrator collects data on the effects of the pollutant on public
health and welfare. From this data he or she calculates a standard, the
"' See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060 (In deciding international legal disputes, the Court considers, "(a) international conven-
tions ... establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states ...
2 GATT, supra note 2, art. XIII:I.
73 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1989 & Supp. 1992).
71 Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A).
iS National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 50.12
(1991).
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attainment and maintenance of which, in his or her judgment, is required
to protect the public health and welfare.76 The standard must allow an
adequate margin of safety.77
The Administrator may commence a civil action against an owner
or operator of a pollution source which violates the Act for a temporary
or permanent injunction to cease the operation of the polluting source,
or assess a penalty of up to $25,000 a day for each violation, or
both.78 In extreme instances, the polluter may be imprisoned for up to
5 years.79
B. The Proposed Amended Clean Air Act
This Note proposes a framework to amend the Clean Air Act in a
manner which would protect the environment and be consistent with the
GATT. Under the proposed Amended Clean Air Act (ACAA), the Ad-
ministrator would promulgate a modified ambient air quality standard
(MAAQS) for each pollutant for sources outside the jurisdiction of the
United States. The MAAQS, like the NAAQS, would reflect a standard
the attainment of which is necessary to protect the public health of the
United States. However, the ratio of the MAAQS would be higher than
the NAAQS, because the modified standard would have to consider the
rate of dissipation of a pollutant before it enters the jurisdiction of the
United States. Therefore, the MAAQS would have to also consider the
distance from the source to the United States. A source two thousand
miles away from the United States would necessarily have a less strict
MAAQS than a source one thousand miles away due to dissipation.
If a manufacturer is found to violate the MAAQS, the importer of
record"° who imports the manufacturer's products to the United States
would face any civil claims and penalties imposed by the ACAA. There
would be no criminal penalties for violating the MAAQS or for import-
ing from manufacturers who violate the MAAQS. The civil penalties
would be assessed on a per unit basis, or the court could order a tempo-
76 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
77 Id.
78 Id. § 7413(b).
7 Id. § 7413(c)(1).
to Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1484(a)(2)(C) (1988) defines the importer of record as
'one who is eligible to file the documentation required by this section." The required documen-
tation includes documents "necessary to enable [the customs] officer to determine whether the
merchandise may be released from customs custody . . . ." Id. § 1484(a)(1)(A). Other required
documentation includes documents "necessary to enable [the customs] officer to assess properly
the duties on the merchandise, collect accurate statistics with respect to the merchandise, and de-
termine whether any other applicable requirement of law . . . is met." Id. § 1484(a)(1)(B).
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rary injunction. Nothing in the ACAA should be construed to prohibit
the importer from passing on the effects of the civil penalties either to
the customers, through higher prices or any other appr6priate method, or
to the manufacturer, through higher service fees or any other appropriate
method.
The party with the burden of proof would be dependant upon the
environmental protection standards of the manufacturer's country. If the
manufacturer is situated in a country that has regulations as strict or
stricter than the MAAQS, there would be a rebuttable presumption of
compliance. Thus, the Administrator would have to prove that the manu-
facturer did not comply with the standard, using convictions against the
manufacturer for the violation of his or her own national environmental
laws, or data on the manufacturer collected by a reliable international
environmental organization, as evidence of non-compliance."1
If the manufacturer is situated in a country that has regulations
below the MAAQS or if the country has no such regulations at all,
there would be a rebuttable presumption of non-compliance. The manu-
facturer could rebut by demonstrating that it is individually in compli-
ance with the MAAQS despite the environmental protection standards of
its country.
The MAAQS for a specific pollutant would be waived if the coun-
try has signed an environmental treaty regarding that pollutant to which
the United States is a party (i.e., the Montreal Protocol).
The Administrator could use data collected by international environ-
mental monitoring organizations, such as the World Meteorological
Organization 2 or Earthwatch,"3 when determining whether a manufac-
turer complies with the MAAQS. The Administrator could also use data
collected by the manufacturing nation's government' or the EPA if the
foreign government consents to the EPA's monitoring.
"I See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
82 See ALEXANDRE C. Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67
(1991). The World Meteorological Organization "is particularly equipped to undertake global
monitoring. It actively participated in the creation of a world system of continuous monitoring of
the environment (GEMS) [Global Environmental Monitoring System], contributing enormously to
the field of environmental protection." Id.
' See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 29. See also Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 82, at
41, 60 & 151. Earthwatch was established in the Action Plan for the Human Environment as a
global environmental assessment program, including evaluation and review, research, monitoring
and information exchanges. Id. at 41. The program ensures continuous surveillance and is interna-
tionally financed. Id. at 151.
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C. The ACAA and the GATT Tuna Panel Report
The ACAA addresses the growing concern that the United States',
or any other nation's, domestic environmental protection laws could
conflict with the GATT.84 A recent example of an environmental law
conflicting with the GATI is the United States Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act85 (MMPA).
In August 1991, a GATT panel ruled that the MMPA, which
banned the importation of tuna harvested by Mexican fishers using
purse-seine nets, sometimes referred to as "driftnets," violated the
GATT.8 6 Mexico challenged a provision of the MMPA which prohibit-
ed the importation of "fish or products from fish which have been
caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the inciden-
tal killing of or serious injury to ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards.""7 The statute requires the exporting country to pro-
vide documentary evidence that "the average rate of that incidental
taking [of ocean mammals] by the vessels of the harvesting nation is
comparable to the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals
by United States vessels in the course of such harvesting ....
American vessels may receive a permit authorizing limited incidental
taking of marine mammals.89
" See GLOBE Members, Experts Debate Effect of Free Trade on World Environment, INT'L
ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Feb. 6, 1992 ("GATT would severely limit the ability of the United
States, or any other country, to maintain higher safety and environmental standards than those
that would be acceptable under GATT because such standards could restrict trade.-); Sinfah
Tunsarawuth, GATT Chief Warns of Trade Conflict on Environment, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 1992
("GATT chief Arthur Dunkel said . . . that domestic environmental standards could lead to
friction as trade partners took action to preserve their own environments."); Dunstan McNichol,
Trade Talks Have Environmental Overtones, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 10, 1992 (GATT
"could deal a fatal blow to environmental legislation . . . ."); Nancy Dunne, Environment Rules
Set Stage for GATT Conflicts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991 at 16 [hereinafter GA7T Conflicts] (Unit-
ed States Senator Max Baucus said "'GATT must recognise [sic] environmental protection as a
legitimate objective of trade policy.'"); GATT Revives Dormant Environment Panel to Ensure
Commerce Views Heard at UNCED, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 5, 1991 ("The World-
wide Fund for Nature has called for a 'significant greening of GATT . . . .'-); Nancy Dunne,
U.S. Call for a GATT Code on Environment, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at 16 (Senator Baucus
claimed there was "'an obvious deficiency' in the GATT which puts trade law above environ-
mental considerations."); Hunt, supra note 3 (noting that the GATT "could hamper the growth of
international agreements to curb industrial pollution and counter global warming.").
' Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1984 & Supp. 1992).
86 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1.
'7 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
' Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii).
'9 Id. § 1373(a).
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Mexican fishers employed purse-seine nets when harvesting
yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. This fishing tech-
nique resulted in the incidental deaths of dolphins, which frequently
swim alongside schools of yellowfin tuna in that part of the Pacific
Ocean. °
1. Article XI
The Panel held that the MMPA violated Article XI of the GATT,
which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imported products. Article
XI:1 provides that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party . . . ." The Panel ruled that "the direct
import prohibition on certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna
products from Mexico and the provisions of the MMPA under which it
is imposed were inconsistent with Article XI:1."92
The Amended Clean Air Act, proposed above, would not violate
Article XI. Article XI speaks of quantitative restrictions on imported
products from other countries. The civil penalties, which would be one
of the "other charges" to which Article XI refers,93 would not be as-
sessed based upon the country of origin. The product's original country
is only considered when determining whether the manufacturer complied
with the MAAQS. Nor do the civil penalties constitute a quantitative re-
striction. An importer remains free to import the same products found to
be violative of the ACAA as long as the importer pays the civil penal-
ties.
2. Article I
Mexico argued, inter alia, that the ban on tuna caught by Mexican
fishers violated Article I of the GATT,94 which provides that import-
ed products shall receive the same regulatory treatment as like products
produced domestically." The Note Ad Article III provides that any
"regulation... which applies to an imported product and the like do-
' George Lobsenz, Administration Seeking Changes to Dolphin Protection Law, UPI, Sept.
27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
"' GAIT, supra note 2, art. XI:1.
92 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1618.
9' GATT, supra note 2, art. XI:1.
9 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1601, 1603-1605.
95 GAIT, supra note 2, art. llI.
19931
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
mestic product is nevertheless to be regarded as a ...regulation of
the kind referred to in [Article Im], and is accordingly subject to the
provisions of Article I. The GATT panel asked,
whether the tuna harvesting regulations could be regarded as a measure
that 'applies to' imported and domestic tuna within the meaning of the
Note Ad Article I and consequently as a measure which the United
States could enforce consistently with that Note in the case of imported
tuna at the time or point of importationY
The Panel noted that Article I applies only to products, not to the
harvesting of the product. "[The Note Ad Article III] covers only mea-
sures applied to imported products that are of the same nature as those
applied to the domestic products .... ,,g The Panel concluded Article
I does not apply to the MMPA.
[T]he Note Ad Article HI covers only those measures that are applied
to the product as such. The Panel noted that the MMPA regulates the
domestic harvesting of yellowfin tuna to reduce the incidental taking of
dolphin, but that these regulations could not be regarded as being ap-
plied to tuna products as such because they would not directly regulate
the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product. There-
fore, the panel found that the import prohibition on certain yellowf'n
tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products of Mexico and the provisions
of the MMPA under which it is imposed did not constitute internal
regulations covered by the Note Ad Article m?.9
The ACAA, like the MMPA, would not apply to the products as
products. While the MMPA addressed the harvesting of the product, to
which Article I is silent, the ACAA would address the manufacturing
of products. Article I poses no barrier to the ACAA.
3. Article XX
In the Tuna case, the United States claimed that GATT Article
XX(b) permits the United States to adopt measures, necessary to protect
animal life or health.1 ° The Panel disagreed.
Id. Annex I.
9' Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1617.
9 Id.
99 Id. at 1618. However, the Panel fails to explain why it did not apply the "products as
products" test when determining the MMPA's compliance with Article X1.
" Id. at 1606. See GATT, supra note 2, art. XX ([N]othing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b)
[V/ol. 25:55
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The Panel held that the party invoking Article XX has the burden
to demonstrate that the article's exception applies. "IT]he practice of
panels has been to interpret Article XX narrowly, to place the burden on
the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation." '' Therefore,
the United States was required to justify the application of Article XX
in the tuna case.
In determining whether the United States properly justified the
application of Article XX(b) when banning the importation of Mexican-
harvested tuna, the Panel asked "whether Article XX(b) covers measures
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health outside the
jurisdiction of the contracting party taking the measure .... .""2 To
address this issue, the Panel considered the drafting history of the Arti-
cle and the Article's purpose. The Panel recognized that "the concerns
of the drafters of Article XX(b) focused on the use of sanitary measures
to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the juris-
diction of the importing country." 03 The Panel concluded that Article
XX(b) would not permit the United States to ban the importation of
tuna harvested by Mexican vessels because the United States was at-
tempting to institute measures outside of its territorial jurisdiction.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Panel noted that the Draft Charter
of the International Trade Organization, a forerunner of the GATT, had
a provision similar to Article XX(b).'0 4 One draft of the Charter's pre-
amble permitted measures inconsistent with the Charter, "'[for the pur-
pose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if correspond-
ing domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing
state." 05
The Panel found further persuasive authority in an earlier GATT
panel ruling. In declaring that Thailand's restriction on the importation
of cigarettes was permissible under the GATT, the earlier panel held
that Article XX(b) permitted a contracting party tt "impose trade restric-
tive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue over-
riding public policy goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were
unavoidable."'"
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . .
101 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1619.
10 Id.
103 Id. at 1620.
104 Id.
"0 Id. (from the New York Draft of ITO Charter).
'06 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of the
Panel adopted Nov. 7, 1990 (DSIO/R), BISD, 37th Supp. supra note 54, at 223, DS10/R, par
74 (1991).
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The Tuna Panel ruled that the unavoidable inconsistencies must be
necessary in order to be included in the Article XX(b) exception."°
The Panel then concluded that the tuna ban was not necessary because
the United States permitted limited incidental killing. The Panel reasoned
that because the United States required Mexico to demonstrate that the
Mexican rate of incidental taking of dolphin was comparable to the
United States' rate, °8 and that Mexico could not know whether, at
any specific time, its taking rate conformed with the United States'
policy until the time period expired, such "a limitation on trade based
on such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as necessary to
protect the health or life of dolphins.""°
The United States might also be required to invoke Article XX in
case a contracting party challenges the ACAA as an unfair barrier to
trade. Under the ACAA, corresponding domestic environmental safe-
guards would exist in the United States. Domestic manufacturers must
comply with NAAQS implementation plans. The NAAQS is necessarily
a stricter standard than the MAAQS for the former does not consider
dissipation of the pollutant outside of the United States. There are also
stricter regulations for monitoring domestic plants. Foreign manufacturers
are monitored by either their own government, which is under no obli-
gation to release its data to the United States, or international environ-
mental groups, which usually do not focus on monitoring a single plant.
Additionally, the parties to the Montreal Protocol used GATT Arti-
cle XX(b) as a method to permit trade restrictions on CFCs." ° A
GATT legal expert affirmed that the parties were properly invoking the
health protection measures embodied in that Article.1
1
'
The ACAA would withstand strict scrutiny under Article XX(b).
American manufacturers must comply with the same environmental pro-
tection standards as foreign manufacturers. The ACAA protects the
environment within the jurisdiction of the United States. Finally, a
GATT legal expert has found that nations may invoke Article XX(b) to
protect its environment.
1 7 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1620.
"s Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii).
09 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 1, at 1620.
210 BENEDICK, supra note 22, at 91.
111 Id.
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D. The ACAA, Countervailing Duties and Subsidies
1. The ACAA is not a Countervailing Duty
According to the GATT Subsidies Code, in order for a contracting
party to classify the proposed Amendments as a countervailing duty, the
United States would first have to establish that the lower environmental
protection standards of other countries constitute a subsidy."' The
United States would then have to demonstrate that the subsidy injured
the United States market for domestic industry. The GATT Subsidies
Code defines "domestic industry" as "the domestic producers as a whole
of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the
products constitutes a major proportion of the total production of those
products."'1 3 The duty which the United States levies upon products
must be proportional to the benefit those products receive from the ex-
porting country because Article VI of the GATT requires that:
[n]o countervailing duty shall be levied on any product ... in excess
of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to
have been granted ... in the country of origin or exportation ....
The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special
duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy be-
stowed, directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or
export of any merchandise." 4
The ACAA would not consider the economic benefit received by
the exporting country from their lower environmental protection stan-
dards. The ACAA would not consider economic interests at all. The
United States would examine the environmental protection laws of other
contracting parties to judge how those laws affect the United States'
environment, not international trade or American industries. Because the
United States would not be considering whether a subsidy exists, the
ACAA does not constitute a countervailing duty.
Additionally, the decision to assess a civil penalty under the ACAA
would rest with a United States judge. In contrast, a decision to levy a
duty rests with the Secretary of the Treasury."' The judge would have
to consider whether the manufacturer violated our environmental laws
before assessing a penalty. The Secretary of the Treasury, by contrast,
..2 GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 57, art. lI:l(a), 31 U.S.T. at 519, 18 I.L.M. at 582.
"' Id. art. VI:5, 31 U.S.T. at 528, 18 I.L.M. at 594.
"' GATT, supra note 2, art. VI:2, 31 U.S.T. at 527, 18 I.L.M. at 593.
n' Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b). The Secretary of the Treasury is the adminis-
tering authority which prescribes countervailing duty regulations. Id. § 1677(1).
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would only consider the economic impact of the subsidy on the foreign
industry and levy a duty equal to the amount of the subsidy." 6
2. The ACAA is not a Subsidy
The ACAA would not constitute a subsidy to United States manu-
facturers. Although the ACAA could indirectly reduce imports of the
number of products, it would not reduce the number of products import-
ed as products. The GATT panel in the Tuna Case carefully distin-
guished regulations affecting products as products and regulations affect-
ing the harvesting or manufacturing of products."1 7 The Panel held that
harvesting or manufacturing regulations are not affected by GATT Arti-
cle rn." 8
The same reasoning may be applied to GATT Article VI. That
Article addresses the subsidy of products as products. The Article does
not address the manufacturing of products. For example, suppose all
widget manufacturers in the United States used the least expensive man-
ufacturing method, while no other contracting party used that method.
The method would not constitute a subsidy despite the fact that the
demand for imported widgets would probably be reduced.
The ACAA does not bestow a benefit upon United States indus-
tries. It only examines the environmental impact of foreign industries
that export to the United States.
The ACAA would not conflict with the GATT. A GATT panel
would probably rule that because the ACAA would not regulate prod-
ucts as products, it would not violate Articles HI or XI. The ACAA
would not constitute either a subsidy or a countervailing duty. Even if a
GATr panel concludes that the ACAA would be inconsistent with these
provision, the United States could claim that the ACAA would be per-
mitted under Article XX(b) as a necessary measure to protect public
health.
CONCLUSION
Despite environmentalists' concerns regarding the GATT Tuna
Panel ruling, that decision does not prohibit nations from passing envi-
ronmental protection standards for imports. The decision merely sets the
boundaries which no nation may exceed.
The IPDA would violate those boundaries. It creates a new defini-
16 Id. § 1303(a).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
118 7,4
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tion for a subsidy, one that is unlikely to survive strict GATr scrutiny.
Although it purports to protect the environment, the Act considers only
economic factors when imposing a countervailing duty.
In contrast, the ACAA would survive strict GATr scrutiny. It
would be neither a countervailing duty or a subsidy. It would not con-
flict with any GATT measures. If a future GATT panel were to rule
that the ACAA does violate a GATT measure, nevertheless, the ACAA
would still be permitted for it legitimately protects public health. The
ACAA would be an effective environmental control measure that com-
plies with the GAT.
Thomas M. Horwitz*
" J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1993).
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